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PRACTICAL REASONING AND INTERPRETATION OF 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
KOSTIANTYN GOROBETS* 
Introduction 
Interpretability of customary (international) law belongs to the class of 
jurisprudential problems that entangle and intertwine almost all thorny theoretical 
and practical issues. It is especially visible against the background of debates around 
whether customary international law (CIL) can be interpreted, and if so, how this 
differs from its identification; are there or should there be some rules of 
interpretation of CIL, and what would be the difference between such rules and 
those guiding interpretation of treaties, etc. 
This contribution aims at addressing some of these issues. It seeks to suggest a 
meaningful way of seeing the process of interpretation of CIL through the 
perspective of practical reasoning. By doing so, the article purports to disentangle 
one of the theoretical knots of interpretation of CIL: what is the difference between 
the identification and interpretation of rules of CIL, considering that both processes 
concentrate mostly on state practices.1 The first section addresses the issue of 
duality of CIL within the doctrine of the container/content distinction, which is of 
fundamental importance to the theory of sources of international law. Section 2 
suggests a view on (state) practice as being inherently normative, which implies the 
differentiation between tests for normativity and legality when patterns of 
behaviour are concerned. Section 3 provides a more detailed analysis of customary 
normativity. The concluding section highlights the difference in interpretation of 
                                                 
* PhD Student, Department of Transboundary Legal Studies, University of Groningen, 
k.v.gorobets@rug.nl. 
1 This contribution does not address the issue of opinio juris and touches upon the legality of 
customary rules only briefly. It is worth mentioning, nevertheless, that by stating that state practice is of 
primary interest for interpretation of CIL (and for its identification, too), I endorse the view that the 
normativity of rules of CIL should be separated from their legality, or legal bindingness. See, for example, 
Murice Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International Law’ (1998) 272 Recueil des Cours de 
l’Académie de Droit International; Maiko Meguro, ‘Distinguishing the Legal Bindingness and Normative 
Content of Customary International Law’ (2017) 6 ESIL Reflections 1. 
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state practice depending on their container/content perception and will therefore 
attempt a differentiation between the interpretation for the purpose of 
identification and interpretation for the purpose of clarification/application of a rule 
of CIL. 
1. What is this thing we interpret when we say that we interpret CIL? 
It is at the core of most contemporary doctrines of legal interpretation that 
interpretation of something is interpretation of something. In order to interpret a 
thing, this thing must already be there, and so its existence, meaning, and function 
are in principle independent from an act of interpretation. This primary intuition 
allows to differentiate between interpretation and creation or invention.2 But it also 
assumes that locating a thing and interpreting it are two distinct enterprises; 
identifying a rule of CIL and clarifying its meaning supposedly are not the same.3 In 
this regard, legal interpretation is tightly linked to the doctrine of sources of law; 
interpretation of law presupposes that one knows where to find it and how to 
identify it amongst other forms of social normativity. 
The doctrine of sources is a groundwork of legal positivism. That a legal order 
rests on certain sources entails that a specific class of utterances or actions qualify 
as generating or communicating the law if they match criteria of validity that 
emerge from within this legal order. Thus in domestic law we often say that, for 
instance, statutes or precedents are sources of law in a sense that certain activities 
of certain bodies (parliament, courts, etc.) within a certain procedure create legal 
obligations for all or some groups of persons. In international law, it is generally 
agreed that treaties and customary rules perform that very same function; they 
create, impose, or generate legal obligations for states. 
                                                 
2 See on these and other philosophical and methodological problems of interpretation: Julie Dickson, 
‘Interpretation and Coherence in Legal Reasoning’ (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2016) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/legal-reas-interpret/> accessed 16 April 2019. 
3 See Panos Merkouris, ‘Interpreting the Customary Rules on Interpretation’ (2017) 19 International 
Community Law Review 126. Although this has been a debatable issue in international legal literature, this 
contribution builds on a presumption that law in general is an intrinsically interpretable enterprise, and 
therefore it must be proved that CIL cannot be interpreted, rather than vice versa. See, on the inherently 
interpretative nature of law, Ronald M. Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’ in Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1977); 
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap Press 1986) 45–86. 
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 5 
Usually, though not always, qualification of some social facts as matching 
criteria of validity has nothing to do with the content of a purported source. As 
famously framed by Herbert Hart, having criteria of validity for sources of law (‘rule 
of recognition’) entails that ‘members [of social systems] not merely come to accept 
separate rules piecemeal, but are committed to the acceptance in advance of general 
classes of rules, marked out by general criteria of validity’.4 This commitment to 
accept in advance certain classes of rules presupposes that sources of law are 
merely containers, and their content does not typically play a role in qualifying a 
source of law as such.5 Hence the fundamental postulate of legal positivism is that 
identifying something as law is separated from assessing its merits.6 
The container/content duality is of paramount importance for legal 
interpretation.7 One may only engage in legal interpretation if one knows that the 
normative content one wants to clarify, elucidate, or in any other way meaningfully 
operationalise, is contained in a valid source of law. In the case of statutory 
interpretation, a statute is a container of legal rules one wants to interpret. In case of 
treaty law,8 it is a treaty that is the container, and its provisions form its content. But 
how about CIL? What is this thing that contains customary rules? This question has 
no obvious answer, though it is maintained, by the International Law Commission 
(ILC) for example, that in case of CIL the content/container differentiation still 
                                                 
4 Herbert L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, OUP 1994) 235. 
5 This is without prejudice to the debates around ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ forms of legal positivism. 
For ‘inclusive’ legal positivists, certain moral principles may play a role in identifying valid law, which means 
that law’s content may precede its container. See, for a general critique of such a view: Scott J. Shapiro, ‘On 
Hart’s Way Out’ (1998) 4 Legal Theory 469. 
6 This links to the idea of content-independence as being one of the critical features of law within the 
positivist paradigm. See a classical contribution by Herbert Hart: Herbert L. A. Hart, ‘Commands and 
Authoritative Legal Reasons’ in Essays on Bentham. Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy (Oxford 
University Press 1982). According to Nathan Adams, ‘a command can be a content-independent reason only 
because the command itself is a container. A command is a speech act that has referential content; its content 
is the act that it refers to. To say that a command is a content-independent reason to obey is to say that its 
status as a reason to obey depends on features of the container (the speech act), not on features of the 
content (what the speech act refers to)’. N. P. Adams, ‘In Defense of Content-Independence’ (2017) 23 Legal 
Theory 143, 147 (italics added). 
7 For other instances of operationalisation of this dualism, see, for example, J. d’Aspremont, ‘Softness in 
International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials’ (2008) 19 EJIL 1075. 
8 Hereinafter, when invoking treaty law as an example, I mean treaty law within the paradigm of the 
VCLT. 
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 6 
applies.9 What, then, is the container one is looking for in order to enquire into the 
content of a rule of CIL? 
Apparently, interpretation of CIL is not an interpretation of some texts, since it 
is widely agreed that CIL is an unwritten source of international law. It may, 
however, have some textual loci in treaties, judgments, statements by state organs, 
etc. Although true, this does not infringe on the fact that linguistic formulas, or 
certain articulations of customary rules, are not customary rules themselves. They 
may serve as points of reference, as useful short-hand devices used to communicate, 
translate, and more efficiently engage in practice that sustain a customary rule, but 
it would be a mistake to say that a statement of a customary rule by an authority 
(institutional or academic) is the customary rule itself. In other words, linguistic 
formulations are but evidences of existence of customary rules, not rules as such. 
This is true for any type of customary rules, not only legal ones. The same way as 
judgments merely reflect, articulate, frame customary legal rules that are already 
somewhere there and exist independently of the fact that a court engages them, 
manuals of English grammar are also but snapshots of the customary rules of 
language. Neither of these two can be appropriately used as a criterion for 
maintaining the practices, and it is actually the other way around: we often discard 
certain articulations of customary rules as outdated or inaccurate on the basis that 
this is not how we do (anymore). Therefore, it is the practice in itself which is the 
ultimate criterion of a customary rule, not its certain pronouncement.10 
Also, interpretation of CIL is not an interpretation of intention, or will of a 
purported author. Unlike treaties, or statutes in domestic law, customary rules 
cannot be said to have determinate authors. It is a distinct feature of customs that 
they are matter of what we do, not of what one particular member of community 
                                                 
9 The ILC holds the view that the determination of ‘the “existence and content” of rules of customary 
international law reflects the fact that while often the need is to identify both the existence and the content of 
a rule, in some cases it is accepted that the rule exists but its precise content is disputed’. ILC, ‘Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its 70th Session’ (30 April – 1 June and 2 July – 10 August 
2018) UN Doc a/73/10, 124 (italics added). The differentiation between the existence and the content of a 
rule of CIL inevitably implies the container/content duality since there is no other way for treating the 
ascertainment of the existence of a rule of CIL as an independent mental procedure except for assuming that 
this rule appears as a container. 
10 Certainly, it can be submitted that such codes of customary rules as manuals of grammar do function 
as standards for how to use a language properly. Although true, it should be remembered that it is not that 
manuals are sources of the rules of grammar, but rules of grammar get systematised in manuals; and should 
the practices change, so will the manuals, and not the other way around. 
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might do on her own.11 As put by Gerald Postema, ‘custom is never reducible to 
what each participant does or to what each says, or thinks, or believes about what 
each does’.12 Thus, even though it may be the case for some customs that they got 
intentionally sparked by one action of one particular actor,13 that actor would not, 
nevertheless, qualify as its ‘author’. If her action ever rises to a customary rule, this 
means that it is our rule, not hers. This, once again, is a feature of customary rules 
generally, not only legal ones, since what separates them from rules being 
established externally is that customary rules are rules of a community, not rules for 
it. They do not get created by someone for the community, rather, they grow from 
within the community and define it as such.14 Identification of an author of a rule 
only makes sense when a rule was intentionally designed to bind only particular 
actors (like in the case of agreements, be it a contract in domestic law or a treaty in 
international law), or when a rule gets imposed by a law-maker, since in this 
situation it is necessary to be able to differentiate between a ‘genuine’ and a ‘fake’ 
law-maker.15 Neither of the two situations are proper descriptions of the context of 
customary law creation or appearance. Thus, even though it is at times common, in 
international law specifically, to design a customary rule consciously, this does not 
suggest that the interpretation of such a rule, when it comes to its application, would 
be an interpretation of some intentions. 
It appears that interpretation of CIL is first and foremost interpretation of state 
practice.16 The same way as we interpret other customary rules, say, rules of 
language, or rules of etiquette, when we interpret CIL, we enquire into what, how, in 
                                                 
11 Even though it can be argued that the formation of customary rules typically involves only a limited 
amount of states and therefore CIL suffers from a significant democratic deficit (see, for instance: Anthea 
Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ (2001) 95 
AJIL 757, 767 ff.), this does not defy the point that the states which do shape the practice in question cannot 
be called ‘authors’ of customary rules. 
12 Gerald J. Postema, ‘Custom, Normative Practice, and the Law’ (2012) 62 Duke Law Journal 707, 719. 
13 The 1945 Truman Proclamation on the continental shelf is a classic example in this regard: 1945 US 
Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the 
Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 10 FR 12303 (1945) 13 DSB 485. 
14 This also holds true for regional or even bilateral customary rules. 
15 The latter point was one of the main lines of Herbert Hart’s critique on John Austin’s conception of 
law as constituting of commands issued by a sovereign. Hart, supra note (4) chs II, IV. 
16 By ‘state practices’ I mean a slightly different concept than the one being typically used in 
international legal scholarship. I defend the view that any practice is normative by definition, otherwise it is 
not a practice at all. This goes against the commonly accepted view that ‘mere’ state practices are but 
collections of actions and fail to constitute a norm. I discuss this issue in the next section. 
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which circumstances, and so on, participants of a certain practice do and do not do. 
In case of CIL, a state practice is the ultimate point of reference one has when 
clarifying a particular legal rule. I will further define what I mean by state practice in 
the next section. For now, it suffice to stress that unlike in the case of statutes or 
precedents in domestic law, or treaties in international law, state practice is not only 
the container but is also the content of a rule one wants to interpret. From the 
perspective of the doctrine of sources of law, customary rules often appear uneasy 
to deal with, for they are not only a source of law, they are law themselves.17 That 
state practice is both content and container, however, engenders consequences for 
what the interpretation of customary rules actually entails. 
The content/container dualism of state practices makes them similar to light, 
i.e. they manifest differently depending on how they are looked at. Light, as known, 
behaves as a wave in one set of circumstances, and as particles in another, and as 
such is, in fact, both.18 This can also be said about state practice, for when it is 
interpreted for the purposes of identification of a rule of CIL it appears as its 
container, as something legal obligations are scooped from (see section 4.1); but 
when it is interpreted for the purpose of clarifying the meaning of a rule of CIL, it 
appears as its content, as what the rule is in itself content-wise (see section 4.2). 
This dualism of state practices creates a confusion as to how these two instances or 
cases of interpretation differ. If identification and interpretation are, according to 
the doctrine of sources, different enterprises, how does one tell the difference 
between the two if both concentrate on state practice?  
Before answering this question, it is necessary to take a closer look at state 
practice as such, since clarifying its nature is of paramount importance for the 
further enquiry. 
                                                 
17 See, for a similar point: László Blutman, ‘Conceptual Confusion and Methodological Deficiencies: 
Some Ways That Theories on Customary International Law Fail’ (2014) 25 EJIL 529, 532: ‘It is misleading to 
suggest that customary international law is one of the sources of international law. Customary international 
law forms part of international law. If it is part of international law, then it cannot be its source’. 
18 See, Walter Greiner, Quantum Mechanics: An Introduction (4th ed, Springer 2001). 
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2. State Practice and Normative Deeds 
Though it is typically asserted that the concept of opinio juris is far more contested 
than the concept of state practice,19 the latter also carries many controversies with 
it. This is partly so due to its container/content duality, but also due to some 
conceptual assumptions regarding state practices that are deeply rooted in the 
doctrines of formation and identification of CIL, and are constantly replicated in 
international legal scholarship. 
It is a widespread belief, reflected, among other, in the ILC reports and 
conclusions, and emerging from the famous North Sea Continental Shelf judgment, 
that a general practice that is accepted as law is to be distinguished from mere usage 
or habit.20 To put it in the ILC words, ‘practice without acceptance as law […], even if 
widespread and consistent, can be no more than a non-binding usage’.21 A 
characteristic feature of approaching state practice with the doctrine of 
identification of CIL, defended also by the ILC, is an all-or-nothingness. It appears 
that there are only two options: either a state practice is accompanied by opinio 
juris and then may, if quantitative and qualitative requirements are met, constitute a 
rule of CIL, or, if it is not, then there exists no obligation for states to act in a certain 
manner whatsoever. Without opinio juris, it is therefore believed, state practice is 
mere usage or habit that has no binding force. This is also articulated by the ICJ that 
‘many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are 
performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of 
courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty’.22 It is, 
therefore, out of paramount importance that ‘one must look at what States actually 
do and seek to determine whether they recognize an obligation or a right to act in 
that way’.23 The position of the ICJ and ILC on this matter clearly opposes legal 
customary rules and their absence, which is reasonable from the point of view of 
legal logic. What is disturbing, however, is how state practices are thought of when 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Bin Cheng, ‘Opinio Juris: A Key Concept in International Law That Is Much 
Misunderstood’ in Sienho Yee and Wang Tieva (eds), International Law in the Post-Cold War World: Essays in 
Memory of Li Haopei (Routledge 2001). 
20 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. Denmark; Germany v. Netherlands) (Merits) (1969) 
ICJ Reports, para 77. 
21 ILC, supra note (9), p. 126 (italics added). 
22 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note (20) para. 77 (italics added). 
23 ILC, supra note (9), p. 125 (italics added). 
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there is no opinio juris. The wording adopted by both institutions not only suggests 
absence of any obligations within such practices, but also non-normativity of such 
practices;24 a view widely supported in the academic literature.25 Opinio juris 
appears as a magic wand that not only turns the ‘raw material’ of state practices into 
a norm, but simultaneously into a legal norm. 
What seems to be an underlying principle behind such a treatment of state 
practice rests on two interrelated ideas. First, it is clear that the identification of CIL 
serves the purpose of establishing the existence of a legal obligation binding upon 
states. When interpreting state practices for this purpose, one therefore asks 
questions of legality, i.e. whether there exists a norm that provides for legal 
obligations states must fulfil. What goes alongside with it, however, often remains 
fully or partly unnoticed; namely, that legality is an attribute of a norm,26 and 
therefore inquiring into whether there is a legal norm is asking two questions, not 
one: (1) is there a norm (the question of normativity); (2) if yes, is this norm a legal 
one (the question of legality). Importantly, these questions should be answered in 
                                                 
24 It is worth noticing, however, that at times the Court does draw a line between normativity and 
legality, for instance, by saying that ‘provision concerned should, at least potentially, be of a fundamentally 
norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law’. North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, supra note (20) para. 72. This statement, however, relates to the provision of a 
treaty, not that of a CIL. It can also be argued that the ICJ should not be concerned with determination of a 
normative character of some regularities of behaviour, when it is obvious that they do not constitute a legal 
rule. However, as will be shown later, the determination of legality of a norm comes only after the normativity 
question is answered, so the Court essentially skips a step in the law-ascertainment, which results in such an 
ambiguous language regarding the non-legal customs. In the case of ILC, this is even more visible. 
25 Lázló Blutman argues that ‘State practice, as a practice-like phenomenon, does not take the form of a 
norm in itself. I am of the view that it is not state practice but, rather, the rule or regularity of which state 
practice is a manifestation that can be accepted as law’. Blutman supra note (16) 535 (emphasis added). This 
view explicitly assumes that existence of a practice is one thing and the existence of a norm it manifests is 
another. See also Michael Akehurst who argues that without opinio juris there is no way to tell the difference 
between habitual actions and rule-guided behaviour: Michael Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International 
Law’ (1976) 47 BYIL 1, 33. Anthea Roberts refers to state practice as the ‘raw data’, which, taken together 
with opinio juris must be further tested to see ‘if there are any eligible interpretations that adequately explain 
the raw data of practice’. See Roberts, supra note (11) 788. As nicely put by Hugh Thirlway, opinio juris is 
similar to ‘the philosopher’s stone which transmutes the inert mass of accumulated usage into the gold of 
binding legal rules’. Hugh W. A. Thirlway, International Customary Law and Codification (Sijthoff 1972) 47 
(emphasis added). 
26 This does not imply that everything that can, in some legal order, qualify as law is by necessity 
normative. In any legal order there are laws which are not norms (e.g. declarations or recommendations). 
See, Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of the Legal System (2nd edn, 
OUP 1980) 168 ff. 
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this particular order. The question of normativity, though, bears entirely different 
considerations and should be approached with a distinct methodology and 
conceptual framework, than the question of legality.27 
The language adopted by the ILC and ICJ, however, makes it seem as if deciding 
on the legality of certain practices is fundamentally the same as deciding on their 
normativity; when a practice does not meet the threshold of legality, it is a habit or a 
usage that creates no obligation or a right, which is basically tantamount to the 
absence of a norm altogether. This brings the second assumption into play, namely, 
that state practice is often taken as a certain collection of individual acts of states, a 
collection that may or may not feature some pattern (acts that are ‘performed 
almost invariably’ – as if their performance is a matter of (in)variability, rather than 
following certain normative consideration). It is thus claimed that ‘the requirement 
that the practice be consistent means that where the relevant acts are divergent to 
the extent that no pattern of behaviour can be discerned, no general practice (and 
thus no corresponding rule of customary international law) can be said to exist’.28 
The focus on (in)variability and patterns of behaviour that is so explicit in the 
reasoning of the ILC and the ICJ, seems to neglect the idea that the existence of an 
observable pattern of conduct is not a relevant marker of there being a practice. 
Invariability of some actions, even when absolutely consistent, may or may not be 
an evidence of a practice. What is crucial here is that it is not adding something (like 
opinio juris) to some actions which turns them into a practice and therefore norm, 
but rather the meaning these actions have for those involved in a practice within a 
wider set of considerations. It is a well-known example by Herbert Hart that for an 
external observer all more or less consistent regularities of behaviour look the same 
in terms of people doing certain things in certain circumstances. However, that 
some people go to a cinema once a week does not mean that there is a normative 
consideration to that effect, i.e. that it is somehow socially expected or required 
from them to go to a cinema once a week.29 On the other hand, that all people lie 
from time to time (some people more often that others) does not deny the existence 
of a normative consideration that one must not lie. Thus, that some people go to a 
cinema once a week is a regularity of behaviour, but not a practice. The only way to 
differentiate between people following a norm and people acting uniformly without 
                                                 
27 See next section, below. 
28 ILC, supra note (9), p. 137 (italics added). 
29 Hart, supra note (4) 10–11. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3578320
 
 12 
following any norm is to adopt what Herbert Hart calls ‘the internal point of view’. It 
is impossible to tell the difference between the two ‘from the outside’. So let us take 
a closer look at the concept of practice, for it is of a crucial importance for our 
understanding of customary rules and their interpretation. 
Practices, unlike mere regularities of behaviour (like that some people happen 
to go to the cinema once a week), are inherently normative. In ordinary life, it can be 
said that at the moment a person steps into a practice, she is expected to accept 
certain deeds that infiltrate and govern this practice, give it shape and make it 
meaningful for the participants. A simple test to be used to determine whether a 
regularity of behaviour is a practice is whether one may fail in performing or not 
performing certain actions. This is typically ascertained either through existing 
mutual expectations that deeds of practice are and will be followed, or through 
criticism explicated when these deeds are ignored, this criticism being an aspect of 
the practice concerned.30 For people who happened to go to a cinema once a week, it 
is not a failure not to go there this week, but go twice the next one instead; no-one’s 
expectations are failed to be met, and no criticism would follow. At the same time, 
lying to people does constitute a failure to meet certain expectations, even when no 
criticism follows (not all lies get discovered, after all). 
The difference between the two is that in the former example, there is nothing 
to be failed; there are no deeds flowing through the conduct of going to a cinema 
with a certain regularity, and therefore there is no practice, regardless of the fact 
that for an external observer this could be the most consistent pattern of behaviour 
by these people he can observe.31 In the latter example, though, there is a certain 
standard embedded into behaviour, a standard that constitutes a deed and 
generates certain expectations that other participants of a practice would follow this 
                                                 
30 Note that expectations and criticism are themselves aspects of a practice, not something to be added 
to a practice to make it normative, as the two-element theory of customary norms suggests. See Pauline 
Westerman, ‘Opinio Juris: The Persistence of the Doctrine’ in P. Westerman, K. Gorobets, A, Hadjigeorgiou 
(eds) (De)Constructing International Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020) (forthcoming). 
31 In this example, I simplify conditions of existence of practice for the sake of clarity. In actual 
situations, there may exist expectations regarding even such a behaviour. The transition from regularity of 
behaviour to a practice is typically of a discrete nature. If I typically go to the cinema once a week with my 
wife, this may gradually grow into a practice simply because she may start having expectations regarding our 
going to the cinema, and my behaviour will inevitably be altered (at least motivation-wise) by the mere 
existence of such expectations. Therefore, if I am unable to go to the cinema one week this may in fact count 
as a failure of meeting expectation. 
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deed.32 What differentiates practices from regularities of behaviour, therefore, is the 
existence of deeds as certain standards that get learned and adopted by the 
participants of a practice and generate expectations regarding other participants.33 
Practices, in such a way, are inherently normative, because the mere existence of 
deeds as standards constitutes an independent reason for acting in one way and not 
in another. As emphasised by Gerald Postema, 
[Customs] are not (merely) patterns of behavior; rather they set standards for behavior, 
standards of correct and incorrect behavior, and thus purport to guide that behavior and 
provide bases for its assessment. Thus, mere regularities of behavior taken alone – the 
usus or ‘state practice’ of international law discourse – not only fail to constitute customs 
of international law, they fail to constitute customs of any sort, including those of 
‘comity’, because they fail to constitute norms.34 
From this perspective, customary rules do not and cannot exist separately or 
detached from practices that sustain them; on the other hand, that there is a 
practice, and not just regularity of behaviour, means that there is a norm that shapes 
this practice. In other words, to say that there exists a state practice on a certain 
matter already entails saying that there is a norm on this matter, and vice versa. For 
                                                 
32 This is also important in the context of discussions around what counts as practice for the purposes 
of CIL. Can it be said, for instance, that there is a rule of CIL prohibiting torture if states actually engage in 
torture? This is a question similar to ‘Can it be said that there is a rule that prohibits lying if everyone lies?’ It 
is often not the actions that matter, because practice is never reducible to actions. It is the reaction that 
matters. We all lie, but we also condemn lying. Our condemnation is what matters for determining the content 
of the practice, rather than our failure to conform to the normative standard embedded in this practice; 
condemnation is such an aspect of a practice as not lying. The same goes for the prohibition of torture; it is 
not that states engage in torture that matters, but rather their attitude towards it. For this reason, the 
argument by Anthea Roberts that the prohibition of torture is an example of ‘modern custom’, because it puts 
more weight on opinio juris rather than on state practice is besides the point. See, Roberts, supra note (11) 
764. The ICJ took a similar position, though in a different context, when stated that ‘in order to deduce the 
existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be 
consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally 
have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule’. Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activity in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) (Merits) (1986) ICJ Rep 14, para 186. 
33 As famously marked by Lon Fuller, ‘customary law arises […] out of situations of human interaction 
where each participant guides himself by an anticipation of what the other will do and will expect him to do’. 
Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (Frederick A Praeger, Pbl 1968) 73. 
34 Gerald J. Postema, ‘Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account’ in Amanda Perreau-
Saussine and James Bernard Murphy (eds), The Nature of Customary Law: Legal, Historical, and Philosophical 
Perspectives (CUP 2007) 285 (italics original). 
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this reason, it is not entirely accurate to ascertain that when a certain practice fails 
to qualify as a rule of CIL, there is no moral or social obligation in general binding 
upon states that flows from the deeds and mutual expectation of participants of such 
a practice. 
This view on state practice was particularly endorsed by the ILA in its 
‘Statements of Principles Applicable to Formation of General Customary 
International Law’, where it claims that 
a rule of customary international law is one which is created and sustained by the 
constant and uniform practice of States and other subjects of international law in or 
impinging upon their international legal relations, in circumstances which give rise to a 
legitimate expectation of similar conduct in the future.35 
To recapitulate, there are two fundamental considerations flowing from the view 
expressed above. First, practices (any practices, not just state practices) are 
inherently normative, otherwise they are not practices whatsoever. The normativity 
of practices is determined by the character of deeds framing them and by the 
function these practices perform for the participants. According to Gerald Postema, 
the normativity of practices is ascertainable first and foremost from the perspective 
of those participating in them (what Herbert Hart calls the ‘internal point of view’): 
Those who participate in a custom’s practice undertake commitments (a) to judge 
certain performances as appropriate or correct and others as mistaken; (b) to act when 
the occasion arises in accord with these judgments; (c) to challenge conduct that falls 
short of these judgments; and (d) to recognize appeals to the judgments as vindications 
of their actions or valid criticisms of them.36 
Second, the content and meaning of customary rules can be (and usually is) 
determined without necessarily assessing the character and nature of normative 
claims they constitute (moral, legal, etc.). Hence, practices always create obligations 
and endow those participating in them with rights. This does not mean that these 
obligations and rights are of legal nature, but it is important to bear in mind that 
absence of opinio juris does not signify absence of any obligation. 
                                                 
35 Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, ‘Final Report of the Committee’ 
in International Law Association Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference (London 2000) (International Law 
Association, London 2000) 712, 719. 
36 Postema, supra note (12) 719. It is important to notice that these commitments are not steps or 
stages of integration into practice; all of them are intertwined and none of them can be detached from the rest 
(I am grateful to André de Hoogh for drawing my attention to this). 
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With an image of state practice as inherently normative, we may now make a 
further step and try to clarify how such practice can be reconstructed for the 
purposes of interpretation. What does the normativity of practice look like and what 
are interpretative beacons one may use in order to clarify its meaning? 
3. Practice as Network of Reasons 
In the previous section, I endorsed the conception that practice is of inherently 
normative nature, and that getting involved into a practice means accepting and 
following certain normative standards that are embodied into it and are inseparable 
from deeds penetrating and shaping it. This view entails, among other things, that 
practice is sustained by mutual expectations of participants and by more or less 
implicit normative standards that one in principle is able to fail to meet. 
Importantly, such character of practice makes it normative, and this normativity 
may, under certain circumstances, qualify as legal. This characteristic of practice is 
by and large generic and applies to state practice as well. 
Normativity, according to a dominant view, reflects a special ability of law and 
other social practices to provide those participating in them with reasons for 
action.37 In other words, practice, such as state practice, is normative in a sense that 
for those who participate in it the mere fact that they do so is a reason for acting and 
reacting to the actions of other participants in a certain way. This reason-giving 
function of practice, in its normative manifestation (i.e. from the internal point of 
view), entails that it requires meaningful participation, and this meaningfulness 
comprises of participants’ ability to recognise and react to actions of others in a way 
that is intelligible for the rest of the participants. This is precisely why, even when 
states do not explicate their position regarding actions of other states, this may still 
contribute to formation of a new, or sustaining an existing, practice. Even an 
absence of reaction may, under certain circumstances, get deciphered by other 
participants of a practice meaningfully either as endorsement or at least as 
acquiescence. 
                                                 
37 See, generally Stefano Bertea and George Pavlakos (eds), New Essays on the Normativity of Law 
(Hart Publishing 2011); Sylvie Delacroix, ‘Hart’s and Kelsen’s Concepts of Normativity Contrasted’ (2004) 17 
Ratio Juris 501; Noam Gur, Legal Directives and Practical Reasons (OUP 2018); Jeffrey Kaplan, ‘Attitude and 
the Normativity of Law’ (2017) 36 Law and Philosophy 469; Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (2nd 
edn, OUP 1999). 
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For such a meaningful participation, states must consider practice not only as a 
reason, but as a network of reasons. It is almost never the case that a practice can in 
one way or another be boiled down to one reason that states ought to comply with. 
In fact, especially when we look at a broader scope of social practices, even the 
simplest ones (such as a practice of eating with a fork and a knife) are only 
meaningful when taken in a context of a much wider set of considerations. But what 
is more fundamental for the purposes of interpretation and for the purposes of 
identification of a state practice is that reasons comprising a practice vary in nature, 
function, and strength. 
One of the most popular and influential explanations of normativity, developed 
by Joseph Raz, suggests that even though norms are reasons for actions, not all 
reasons are norms.38 A reason for action, according to his latest definition, is ‘a 
consideration that renders its [i.e. action’s] choice intelligible, and counts in its 
favor’.39 Reasons as such do not give rise to obligations, but it is nevertheless a basic 
moral principle that one ought to act according to an optimal balance of reasons one 
has, all things considered. This equally applies to states, since it is almost never 
disputed that they are morally accountable agents (were they not, it would have 
been impossible to defend even a proposition that international law has any 
function or basis for existence whatsoever). In international relations, states claim 
reasons for their actions all the time, and some of them are norms. Michael 
Akehurst, in his influential article on custom as a source of international law, refers 
to an example of states using white paper for diplomatic correspondence to advance 
his argument that habits do not create rules of law.40 And indeed, that states almost 
unanimously use white paper only shows that they do so for a widely shared reason, 
a reason, which, nevertheless, is not a norm. If not all reasons are norms, how is it 
possible to mark a class of reasons that are norms? 
                                                 
38 See, for an in-depth discussion of reasons and norms, Raz, supra note (37) chs 1–3. 
39 Joseph Raz, ‘The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception’ (2006) 90 Minnesota Law 
Review 1003, 1006. 
40 Akehurst, supra note (25) 33–34. In fact, this argument is not particularly convincing in the light of 
the concept endorsed in the previous section; habits not only fail to create legal obligation, they are in 
principle unable to create any obligation. Overall, this example suggests that Akehurst advances the same 
conception adopted by the ILC, when absence of legal obligation gets contextually equated to an absence of 
any obligation at all. Thus, though making a valid claim that opinio juris helps to distinguish legal obligations 
from non-legal obligations, he seems to suggest that non-legal obligations are essentially no different from the 
absence of an obligation as such. This view, however practical it may be, creates a distorted image of 
normativity of an international order. 
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Joseph Raz’s solution to the problem of norms being linguistically inseparable 
from the rest of the reasons41 suggests that there must be some other criteria 
according to which we could differentiate between ‘mere’ reasons and norms. 
According to Joseph Raz’s influential account, norms are second-order pre-emptive 
reasons,42 and because of this they play a drastically different role in practical 
reasoning as compared to ordinary first-order reasons.43 Norms, just like other 
second-order reasons, are reasons to act or to refrain from acting on some first-
order reasons. For example, states may share a wide set of reasons for not using 
armed force in international relations, and the norm of international law that 
prohibits the use of force is a second-order reason for acting on all those reasons. 
But also, and probably most importantly, the existence of a norm prohibiting the use 
of force is a reason for not acting on certain other first-order reasons. The mere fact 
of such a prohibition implies that states may not act on reasons that count in favour 
of using force against other states. In such a way, norms are second-order reasons in 
the sense that they reinforce some first-order reasons and exclude some other first-
order reasons. What this means is that not only are norms reasons for actions they 
prescribe, but they are also reasons for disregarding reasons for non-compliance.44 
For example, diplomatic immunity is a norm precisely because it is both a reason for 
states to refrain from subjecting diplomats to criminal jurisdiction, and a reason for 
disregarding any other reasons for acting otherwise, no matter how weighty these 
may be, such as in the cases when diplomats cause lethal accidents or interfere into 
                                                 
41 Both norms and ordinary reasons may be appropriately expressed in ‘ought-statements’, and 
therefore purely linguistic analysis is irrelevant for determining the features of normativity. Linguistically, 
there is no difference between a statement ‘You ought to go outside and enjoy the sun’ and a statement ‘You 
ought to drive no faster than 60 km/h in an inhabited area’. Yet it is prima facie clear that the former is a 
statement of a ‘mere’ reason, whereas the latter is a statement of a norm. 
42 The concept of pre-emptive reasons is highly debated. See, for instance, Larry Alexander, ‘Law and 
Exclusionary Reasons’ (1990) 18 Philosophical Topics 5; Stephen Darwall, ‘Authority and Reasons: 
Exclusionary and Second-Personal’ (2010) 120 Ethics 257; Noam Gur, ‘Are Legal Rules Content-Independent 
Reasons?’ (2011) 5 Problema 175; Michael S. Moore, ‘Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons’ (1988) 62 
Southern California Law Review 827. It is beyond the scope of this contribution to engage in the debate on 
this matter. Suffice to say that the idea of pre-emption seems promising in explaining the role norms play in 
practical reasoning, however it is disputable whether pre-emption is a binary or a discrete quality of norms. 
43 Promises, voluntary commitments, orders and commands, and some others are second-order 
reasons, but they are not norms. See, Joseph Raz, ‘Promises and Obligations’ in P. M. S. Hacker and J. Paz (eds), 
Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honor of H. L. A. Hart (Clarendon Press 1977). For the sake of clarity, 
though, whenever a second-order reason is mentioned, it purports a norm. 
44 Raz, supra note (37) 58–59. 
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the internal affairs of the receiving state.45 This pre-emptive character is what 
differentiates norms from other reasons for action. 
Practices are networks of both second-order reasons, i.e. norms, and first-
order reasons. This allows for complex and often multidimensional justificatory 
strategies for one or other course of behaviour.46 Apart from this, however, this 
reflects a feature of norms not only being embedded into practices, but also being 
virtually inseparable from them. Norms, as intrinsically interwoven into practices, 
do not ‘hang in the air’ or exist in some metaphysical space, and their justification, 
therefore, is shaped by, and depends on, a wider network of reasons employed 
within a certain practice. Norms may be justified in a number of ways; as time- and 
labour-saving devices, as error-eliminating devices, i.e. those subjected to such 
norms use them as shortcuts in practical reasoning so that if a norm gets accepted it 
is not necessary anymore to figure out each time an optimal balance of reasons to 
act upon. Some other norms are justified by recourse to an authority, i.e. acceptance 
of a norm comes as a result of acceptance of authorities issuing them. These (and 
many more) methods of justification of norms may overlap and supplement each 
other; in fact, most of the norms by which people are bound have more than just one 
justification.47 
In such a way, practices, such as state practice, explicate their normativity as 
tightly intertwined networks of first- and second-order reasons. Seen as such, their 
interpretation therefore relates to discovering the interconnection between these 
two classes of reasons, assessing their balance, and unveiling them in justifications 
employed by states or implied in their actions. 
4. Asking the Rights Questions: Re-approaching the 
Content/Container Duality 
Thus far this contribution explored the features and intrinsic qualities of a (state) 
practice as the thing being interpreted within the process of legal interpretation. 
                                                 
45 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v 
Iran) (Merits) (1980) ICJ Rep 3, paras 83–87. 
46 From this perspective, Martti Koskenniemi’s idea of the sliding scale between apolitical and utopian 
line of argument, from the perspective of practical reasoning is merely an interplay between first- and 
second-order reasons used for justification of state’s behaviour. See Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to 
Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (2nd edn, CUP 2006). 
47 Raz, supra note (37) 74. 
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Now it is time to take this a step further and take a look at this interpretation anew. 
If a state practice is a network of first- and second-order reasons within which 
states form, manifest, and explicate expectations regarding the actions of other 
states, how does this affect the nature of state practice? How are these networks of 
reasons interpreted when looked at as containers, and when looked at as contents? 
The theory of normativity as a special case of practical reasoning offers an 
illuminating perspective on interpretation of state practice as network of reasons. 
First of all, it allows to clearly differentiate two instances of interpretation: 
interpretation of state practice for the purpose of identification of a rule of CIL, and 
interpretation for the purposes of clarification of its normative content. 
1. INTERPRETATION AS IDENTIFICATION 
The formation of a norm is a steady, gradual, and often slow process, and therefore 
it may be difficult to draw straight lines between a stage when states act for a widely 
shared reason and do not explicate any expectations, a stage practice emerges, and a 
stage when it has fully developed. Yet some features of practical reasoning exploited 
by actors serve as beacons of there to be or not to be a norm and whether it may 
qualify as a legal one. Thus, when states’ actions are looked at with the purpose of 
enquiring whether a new rule of CIL has emerged, the network of reasons appears 
as a purported container, and what states do and how they react to what other 
states do get assessed within a logic of sources of law. This, first and foremost, 
affects the questions through which the interpretation of states’ actions is carried 
out: 
1. do states act for the first-order reasons only, and is there therefore only a 
semblance of a practice (‘regularity of behaviour’)? 
2. or do states act for a second-order reason (i.e. norm), and is there therefore a 
formed practice? 
3. if the latter, then is this second-order reason acted upon and articulated as a 
part of a wider network of legally relevant reasons, i.e. does it conform to 
certain conventional criteria of validity of custom as legal custom?48 
                                                 
48 Opinio juris is such a criterion, for it is a matter of practice of international law to use it as a 
threshold for assessing legal validity of customary rules. Yet it is worth stressing that opinio juris is not an 
element of a customary legal rule, but rather a conventional criterion, according to which the legal relevance 
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Questions (1)-(2) inquire into the existence of a second-order reason that states use 
as a justification for their action. There is a big difference between justification 
based on first-order reasons and justification based on second-order reasons, 
i.e. norms. Justification based on first-order reasons does not purport any 
expectations from other actors and such justification may, as a matter of fact, be 
implicit and not designed as foreseeing, or matching, such expectations. This, 
however, is a much rarer situation than it may appear. In today’s world, states are 
much more often acting within practices than they used to, even when it relates to 
their internal affairs, and therefore justifications, even when implied, are typically 
met with expectations from other actors. Hence, it is normal that first-order 
reasons-based justifications are usually addressed to states’ actions in their 
domestic realm, though even there second-order reasons embedded into state 
practices play a more and more significant role.49 
The existence of a norm manifests in a reason that has a pre-emptive function, 
i.e. a reason that counts for not acting on, and not using as a justification some other 
reasons. Not only does this mean that certain reasons cannot be legitimately acted 
upon, but it also entails that other states expect these reasons to be excluded and 
react accordingly when they are not. This, however, does not in and of itself mean 
that a norm embedded into a practice is a legal norm. There may exist mutual 
expectations as to what reasons may or may not be acted on, and what kind of 
second-order reason bridges them, even when these expectations do not have a 
manifestly legal character. International relations of states are by and large 
governed by such second-order reasons, which means that state practices (and 
hence also norms) are virtually omnipresent.50 
                                                                                                                                                             
of a certain practice is assessed. See, for the same line of argument, Postema, supra note (34); Postema, supra 
note (12). 
49 Similarly, private actions by persons may not constitute any practices, if they do not purport any sort 
of expectations from other persons. States, too, within the doctrine of sovereignty, may organise their internal 
life according to considerations that do not and are not purported to create any expectations for other states. 
Gradually, however, this may change, when even internal affairs of a state create expectations for other states. 
For instance, as the recent situation with Poland suggests, it may be said that there is a gradual movement 
towards operationalising the practices of the Rule of Law as generating political and even legal expectations. 
See European Commission ‘Commission Recommendation regarding the rule of law in Poland’ C(2016) 8950. 
50 This should not come as a surprise, since practices are shadows of interactions. This obviously goes 
against the Lotus principle that ‘rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will 
as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established 
in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.’ 
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The first two questions, in such a way, are asked in order to determine the 
reasons-made boundaries of a container of a customary rule. The third question is 
quite different, though. It aims at establishing whether this container meets the 
requirements of validity set by a legal order. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
discuss the intricacies of legality of state practices, if only because they do not, in 
principle, contribute to the process of interpretation of rules of CIL. The dimension 
of the legality of customary rules, as was suggested in section 1, is typically of little 
relevance to the determination of their content. Let us therefore shift to a different 
mode of interpretation: that aimed at clarification of the content of customary rules. 
2. INTERPRETATION AS CLARIFICATION 
A more specific, and more legally charged instance of interpretation of state 
practices is, certainly, interpretation for the purposes of clarification of the 
normative content of a rule of CIL. This instance of interpretation, however, tends to 
adopt a view of state practice as the content of a rule, rather than its container. This, 
though, does not change the nature of a state practice as a network of reasons, and 
therefore the questions through which interpretation proceeds are again addressed 
to these networks, but these are very different questions: 
1. what first-order reasons does a rule of CIL exclude, i.e., what reasons states may 
not legitimately invoke as justification for their actions within a given practice? 
2. what first-order reasons does a rule of CIL reinforce, i.e. what first-order 
reasons does this norm account for, how does it balance them, and whether this 
balance corresponds to expectations of those involved in a practice? 
Let us address the first question. Since exclusion is of crucial importance for 
differentiating norms from other reasons, interpretation of rules of CIL is primarily 
concerned with what reasons get excluded by a rule that is being interpreted. For 
example, is it meaningful within existing state practices to ascertain that a cyber 
operation as a single ‘hostile’ act employed by one state against another constitutes 
an armed conflict within the meaning of customary rules of international 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (Merits) 1927 PCIJ Rep Series A No 10, para 44 (italics added). 
Human interactions are always practice-based and, consequently, normative. It is not that easy to think of an 
example of human interaction that does not presuppose any mutual expectations and normative deeds. The 
same applies equally to states, since their interaction is but a species of human interaction; it may be almost 
impossible to single out states’ actions in international realm that are not ab initio met with deeds-based 
normative expectations from other states. 
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humanitarian law?51 To translate this into the language of practical reasoning, may a 
state justify the reasons for its act of cyber warfare as not being excluded by the 
norms of IHL? This question can only be answered by looking at how states 
accommodate a new reason into existing deeds; whether they discursively assess 
cyber warfare as an instance of an armed conflict, or as something separate, 
probably creating an independent deed. By its very nature, exclusion is the function 
of a norm that renders acting on certain reasons as violation of this norm, and 
therefore when a new reason emerges from within a practice (a practice of modern 
warfare, in this example), it is a matter of interpretation to ascertain whether this 
new reason can find a place within existing normative deeds, or whether this new 
reason should be excluded from practice and prevented from becoming its deed. 
Where the first question addresses the external boundaries of a practice, i.e. to 
the issues of what kind of reasons count as parts of a practice and what kind of 
reasons are excluded from it, the second question offers a different perspective. It 
relates to the justification of norms, briefly touched upon in the previous section. 
Norms, including legal norms, are typically justified as accounting for a certain 
balance of the first-order reasons that render a practice intelligible. From this 
perspective, norms always serve a purpose of simplifying or optimising participants’ 
compliance with these first-order reasons.52 Interpretation, therefore, may not only 
address the issues of exclusion of some reasons, but also the issues of reassessing or 
even reshaping the balance of reasons that are included into practice. Thus, it is a 
matter of interpretation to inquire whether a rule of CIL adequately reflects and 
accounts for underlying reasons that shape a practice and guide state’s actions.53 If, 
for example, the principle of equidistance as a method of delimitation of continental 
shelves does not properly account for the reasons that comprise the practice of the 
use of continental shelf, there may exist a need to rebalance these reasons according 
to a more fundamental principle.54 Such a rebalancing, though made within a wider 
                                                 
51 ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’ 
(International Committee of the Red Cross 2011) 31IC/11/5.1.2 36–37. 
52 See, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986) 40 ff. 
53 This may be taken in a shape of the object-and-purpose strategy of interpretation which, though 
emerging in the treaty law, may also be used for interpretation of CIL. See, Panos Merkouris, Article 31(3)(C) 
VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration: Normative Shadows in Plato’s Cave (Brill Nijhoff 2015) 263–
269. 
54 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note (20), paras 88–99. 
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normative framework of equity, does affect the balance of reasons represented by 
the equidistance rule; some of the reasons it accounts for are now weightier. 
These two questions, though different from those discussed in the previous 
subsection, build on them. It is in the foundations of legal interpretation to enquire 
into what considerations and in which particular manner legal norms account for. 
And since in the case of customary rules, their content and container are one and the 
same thing, their interpretation ultimately entails clarifying the boundaries of 
practices. The need in this clarification reflects that it is in the nature of practices to 
evolve. The normative deeds comprising the inherent normative standard of a 
practice are typically on the move; not only do they depend on what participants of 
practices do, but also on how they react to actions. Thus, practices constantly 
accommodate new reasons that may or may not affect the perception of the 
normative standard, and this is exactly why interpretation of customary rules is 
essentially an inquiry into the dynamics of practical reasoning implied within a 
practice. 
It is, therefore, not only possible but essential that rules of CIL allow for 
evolutive interpretation. It should be noted, however, that evolutive interpretation 
in the case of treaties is not the same as in the case of CIL.55 For interpretation of 
treaties, evolutive interpretation generally relates to the phenomenon that when 
text of the treaty remains the same, its meaning is altered in the course of time.56 It 
is argued that evolutive interpretation of treaties is justified when there is evidence 
that the parties intended, from the outset, that their treaty would be capable of 
evolving over time, that it can remain effective or relevant in the face of changing 
conditions.57 It is, therefore, essential that evolutive interpretation of treaties is 
based on the provision of art. 31(1) of the VCLT, according to which ‘a treaty shall 
be interpreted […] in the light of its object and purpose’. When a rule of CIL is in 
question, though, it seems not entirely accurate to speak of its object and purpose, 
since rules of CIL cannot be always traced back to some shared intentions, their 
                                                 
55 I am grateful to Prof Adil Haque for drawing my attention to this issue. 
56 Christian Djeffal, Static and Evolutive Treaty Interpretation: A Functional Reconstruction (CUP 
2016) 19. From this perspective, evolutive interpretation relates to the establishment of a change in a treaty 
without its modification. Julian Arato, ‘Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of 
Treaty Interpretation over Time and Their Diverse Consequences’ (2010) 9 The Law & Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 443, 456 ff. 
57 See, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties, Part I’ (2008) HYIL 101, 
153. 
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object and purpose is far less clear and determined than in the case of treaties. In 
the case of treaties, their object and purpose may be an explanandum for the 
purposes of interpretation, but in the case of rules of CIL, they rather appear as 
explanans. In other words, an object and purpose of a customary rule may well be 
the end point of interpretation rather than its starting point. For this reason, 
evolutive interpretation of the rules of CIL relates more to the function a certain 
practice performs and to the meaning its practice has in a wider context of states’ 
activities. Such an evolutive interpretation, then, focuses on reevaluating the 
balance of reasons reflected in a norm, adjusting it to the developing patterns of 
practice itself.58 Every instance of interpretation of a rule of CIL is therefore a 
snapshot of the balance of reasons currently accepted within a practice. However 
since practices are dynamic entities, so are the norms which define them and get 
sustained by them. 
To summarise, the interpretation of state practices as normative networks of 
reasons takes different shape depending on how they are looked at. If a state 
practice is approached as a container and is thus investigated for the purposes of 
identification of a rule of CIL, the main strategy of interpretation will consist in 
assessing whether states act for a second-order reason (a norm, in this context) and 
whether it meets the threshold of legal validity. When a state practice is addressed 
as content, the interpretative strategy will primarily entail determination of those 
reasons a rule of CIL excludes and assessment of whether those reasons it accounts 
for are properly balanced. 
Conclusions 
It is in the core of the idea of CIL that it manifests in a chimeric duality; it is a source 
of international law, and at the same time it is international law as such. By blurring 
the line between container and content, which is essential for the conventional 
doctrine of sources, CIL challenges the process of its interpretation too. State 
practices, which appear as both containers and content of rules of CIL, are subject to 
interpretation from two different positions – when a new rule is identified, and 
                                                 
58 See generally on the idea of rebalancing reasons: Stephen R. Perry, ‘Second-Order Reasons, 
Uncertainty and Legal Theory’ (1989) 62 Southern California Law Review 913. 
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when an existing rule is clarified. This creates confusions as to how to separate 
these two instances of interpretation. 
This contribution endorses the view of state practice as an inherently 
normative network of reasons. Approached as such, a state practice manifests as 
comprising of deeds and reasons, the latter existing on two different levels. The 
normativity of a state practice is explained through there being second-order pre-
emptive reasons, i.e. norms that bridge a variety of first-order reasons, balancing 
and mutually rendering them as meaningful. The interpretation of these norms 
embedded into state practices entails discovering connections between different 
groups and levels of reasons. The interpretation for the purpose of identification of a 
rule of CIL is primarily concerned with a question of whether there is a second-
order reason that systematise expectations and critical stances of states, and 
whether this second-order reason qualifies as a legal one. The interpretation for the 
purposes of clarification, in turn, focuses of what reasons a rule of CIL excludes, and 
what reasons it balances, how well this balance reflects the actual weight of the first 
order reasons, and how to ensure that newly formed reasons are properly assessed 
and accommodated within practice, or get excluded from it. 
Such an approach to state practice and interpretation of CIL allows one to 
distinguish different interpretative stages of a lifecycle of state practice, as well as to 
conceptualise state practice as normative network of reasons. 
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